Inter-dealer trading in US Treasury securities is almost equally divided between two electronic trading platforms that have only slight differences in terms of their relative liquidity and transparency. BrokerTec is more active in the trading of 2-, 5-, and 10-year T-notes while eSpeed has more active trading in the 30-year bond. Over the period studied, eSpeed provides a more pre-trade transparent platform than BrokerTec. We examine the contribution to 'price discovery' of activity in the two platforms using high frequency data. We find that price discovery does not derive equally from the two platforms and that the shares vary across term to maturity. This can be traced to differential trading activities and transparency of the two platforms.
Introduction
Many financial markets are fragmented. At a basic level many markets are fragmented according to the characteristics of the traders involved. Thus, we commonly observe markets with wholesale (broker to broker, B2B) and retail segments (broker to customer, B2C) that have well defined rules separating activity in each space. Fragmentation within the wholesale segment usually occurs for different reasons to those relevant to the wholesale-retail split. Information asymmetry and transparency play important roles in the segmentation of wholesale financial markets. In the case of high sensitivity to the presence of large incipient trades it is well known that fragmentation can often become extreme, resulting in completely opaque transactions between pairs of agents. But do minor differences in trader characteristics and information asymmetry matter for the location of price discovery where trading remains post-trade transparent? We find significant differences in the location and speed of price discovery in the case of the interdealer market in US Treasury Securities. This is probably the largest and most liquid wholesale financial market in the world (excluding foreign exchange markets) and yet it is almost equally divided between two electronic trading platforms that are very similar in terms of their liquidity and transparency. It is, at present unknown as to which of the two segments is the most important source of 'price discovery'. It is also not clear what additional costs are incurred by trading in the less efficient segment.
The present study attempts to uncover the effects of mild differences in pre-trade transparency and liquidity to answer these questions. We examine the location of 'price discovery' and the differential trading costs across this important, almost homogeneous, market. Specifically, we use very high frequency synchronized microstructure data from the eSpeed and BrokerTec markets. BrokerTec is more active in the trading of 2-, 5-, and 10-year T-notes than eSpeed, which has more active trading for 30-year bonds. The two main electronic trading platforms also have slight differences in their 'pre-trade' transparency. The eSpeed platform is more pre-trade transparent than the BrokerTec platform. We find that BrokerTec produces a lower bid-ask spread on average than eSpeed. Our findings are also in line with the experimental results of O'Hara (1999, 2000) about the location of price discovery in the less transparent platform. More price discovery takes place in the less transparent market (BrokerTec) . 4 This platform more frequently possesses a more efficient price. Both of the markets share the same long-run driving dynamic and price adjustment away from disequilibrium between the two markets is mostly located in the movement of prices on the more transparent eSpeed platform. Overall, the size of the price adjustment ('error correction') on eSpeed is larger than on BrokerTec. However, the adjustment coefficient on the more transparent platform is only accurately estimated if the empirical analysis is general enough to control for adjustment to bid-ask spread disequilibrium as well as crossplatform disequilibrium.
We find that the evidence in support of price discovery on BrokerTec has been changing over time and it does not apply equally across all maturities. Where eSpeed has a liquidity advantage in the longer maturities it also accounts for more of the price discovery and less of the adjustment to disequilibrium. Overall the differences in the cost of trading in the alternative trading platforms are not large. In the absence of a significant cost differential between the two platforms we suggest that the main benefit to larger participants of maintaining a presence on both markets is as a protection against the risks of market outages due to technical catastrophes. The small risk of such a costly event seems to be just enough to keep the market fragmented. Another possible reason is the presence of large costs of changing allegiance from one platform to another for the smaller participants.
Most of the extant literature examines only one or other of the two main trading platforms. As far as we know, there are no papers that employ synchronized event-byevent data from these two major platforms. Fragmentation and price discovery is examined by Biais (1993) , and the case of dual platforms with differential transparency has been analyzed theoretically and experimentally in O'Hara (1999 and 2000) . Our analysis is an important step in the process of evidencing the findings of the theoretical assertions already made in this theoretical and experimental literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 introduces the development of US Treasury market electronic trading platforms and the sample data set. The methodology is developed in Section 4. Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 provides conclusions and implications of the paper. 
Literature Review
The extant theoretical literature on market transparency finds that the level of transparency and the relative transparency of market segments has significant effects on market quality (including liquidity, trading costs, and price discovery). A wide variety of studies considers the merits of different trading mechanisms 2 and relates these to liquidity and transparency characteristics -and in particular to those studied by Bloomfield and O'Hara (2000) . More literature can be found in O'Hara (1995), Hasbrouck (2007) and De Jong and Rindi (2009) . Here we present a selective review focusing on market transparency, price discovery and the literature of relevance to the US treasury market. Biais (1993) shows that quotation transparency is likely to increase market efficiency and improve liquidity. Pagano and Roell (1996) argue that greater transparency enhances market liquidity by reducing the opportunities for dealers to take advantage of relatively uninformed participants. Moreover, they suggest that increasing transparency will mainly reduce the average trading costs of uninformed traders. Bloomfield and O'Hara (1999) use a laboratory experiment to investigate effects on market equilibrium under different degrees of market transparency. They suggest that transparency significantly increases the informational efficiency of market price but widens the bid-ask spreads. In a transparent market, the mid-point of bid and ask converges to intrinsic value more quickly. These results are consistent with the finding of Pagano and Roell (1996) . They also show that spreads increase in more transparent conditions. Moreover, they find that the degree of market transparency has important effects on market equilibrium.
Of most relevance to the current study, Bloomfield and O'Hara (2000) examine whether a transparent market segment would survive when faced with direct competition from a less transparent one for the same asset. They focus on the growing regulatory and market concern with market fragmentation. Their concern is that the ability to hide trades in less transparent parallel segments undermines the attractiveness of established markets, and 2 For example, Seppi (1997) finds that small and large investors prefer a hybrid specialist/limit order market, while mid-sized investors prefer pure limit order markets. 6 thereby reduces their crucial role in price discovery. They design two laboratory experiments which involve multiple dealers operating in two market segments with different degrees of transparency. They use a game theoretic approach to model dealer behavior in this context. They find that differential transparency has significant effects on market behaviour. Low-transparency dealers have better performance than transparent participants; they offer lower spreads and capture more of the order flow. Lowtransparency dealers set prices more efficiently and they have more opportunities to set and trade at inside spreads. They make a profit from using their information advantage, while dealers in the more transparent segment make a loss. They also suggest that dealers would endogenously choose to trade in the less transparent market and eventually give rise to the demise of the transparent segment. These findings support the fears of dealers regarding the increasing fragmentation of some markets including the rise of dark pool crossing networks.
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Other experimental studies include Flood, Huisman, Koedijk and Mahieu (1999) and Flood, Koedijk, Dijk and Leeuwen (2002) .
There are many related studies on effects of transparency. Baruch's (2005) theoretical model shows that an increase in transparency reduces liquidity providers' market power and greater transparency leads to more informative prices. Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2005) find that trading costs were reduced for large institutional traders following the introduction of TRACE. The above literature appears to favor increased transparency from a market efficiency and investor protection point of view. However, there are contributions to the literature that questions this conclusion. Madhaven (1996) found trade disclosure increased the costs of trading for large traders. Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2005) find that greater transparency reduced market liquidity and led to a reduction of market depth. Other studies in this vein that focus on equity markets include, Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003) , Boehmer (2004) and Aitken et al. (2006) . Drudi and Massa (2002) investigate how dealers behave in parallel markets with differential transparency for the same Italian sovereign bonds and they find that informed dealers may refrain from trading in the more transparent market in order to benefit from their informational advantage in the less transparent market. Alternatively, informed 3 Anecdotal evidence of this effect is often brought into discussions with market regulators. An example is concerns the effects of the cross-listing of French shares on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Dealers on the Paris Bourse invariably report a loss of trading volume and liquidity provision in Paris reflecting the greater relative opacity of the LSE. 7 traders may use the more transparent market to influence price. They also suggest that the less transparent market improves the liquidity of the more transparent market. In this respect, their results are consistent with the findings of Bloomfield and O'Hara (2000) .
Other event studies include Bortoli, Jarnecic and Johnstone (2006) , Boehmer, Saar and Yu (2005) and Scalia and Vacca (1999) .
As far as the US Treasury market is concerned. Brandt and Kavajecz (2002) Treasury market. They find that effective spreads increase as a result of a small increase in transparency of the eSpeed platform. They conclude that differential market transparency adversely affects the risks borne by dealers. As a result this can adversely affect market liquidity. Mizrach and Neely (2008) highlight the role of the futures markets in price discovery of US Treasury market. Fleming and Mizrach (2009) assess the microstructure of US treasury market using data from the BrokerTec trading platform.
They find that market liquidity is greater than that found in earlier studies that use data only from voice-assisted brokers. They also found that the price effect of trade on BrokerTec is quite small and is even smaller once orderbook information is considered.
Also using the intraday data from the BrokerTec electronic trading platform, Jiang, Lo and Verdelhan (2011) identify jumps in U.S. T-bond prices and investigate what causes such unexpected large price changes. They examine the relative importance of macroeconomic news announcements versus liquidity shocks in explaining the observed jumps. In addition, they examine the informativeness of order flow immediately after bond price jumps.
In the literature of price discovery in market microstructure models, there are two competing approaches to estimating the parameters of price discovery in cointegrated time series: the information shares as defined in Hasbrouck (1995) and the permanenttransitory decomposition of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) , applied in the market microstructure literature by e.g. Booth, So and Tse (1999) , Baillie et al. (2002) , Harris et al. (2002) . These two models complement each other and provide different views of the price discovery process between markets. The Hasbrouck model considers each market's 8 contribution to the variance of the innovations to the common factor, while the Gonzalo and Granger model focuses on the components of the common factor and the error correction process and they attribute a greater share of price discovery to the market that adjusts least to the price movement in the other markets. De Jong (2002) derives the relationship between the two approaches. Putniņš (2013) concisely reviews the latest development in this area, and clarifies what the 'information share' and the 'component share' exactly measure. Our study is focusing on the same US Treasury securities that traded on two very similar and competitive platforms, BrokerTec and eSpeed. We aim to identify which platform is more informative in the sense that prices of the platform adjust least to the true efficient price. So, we adopt the Gonzalo and Granger model in this paper.
The US Treasury Market Electronic Trading Platforms and Data
In the US Treasury Market the assets being traded are very simple in terms of possible asymmetric information about cash flows and default characteristics. The only source of asymmetric information in the inter-dealer segment of this market is 'position information' and perhaps information about differential trading strategies. This market is inherently very liquid and so it is unlikely that prices depart from fundamentals for long or that trading costs differ significantly regardless of where trading takes place. Also, since the market is very transparent, fragmentation is easy to facilitate in the sense that a reference price is available from which to benchmark bilateral transactions. While the market is very homogeneous it is not perfectly so. The two main electronic trading platforms have slight differences in their 'pre-trade' transparency and their share of activity. In this section, we give a brief introduction on the development of the US Treasury market detailing the important differences between the main platforms.
The US Treasury market plays an important role in the international financial system because of its size, liquidity and low transaction cost. There were more than $5 trillion US Treasury securities outstanding at the end of the sample period chosen for this study . This view is very easy to interpret and reveals whether bids and asks are made up from multiple buyers and sellers, single or multiple substantial orders or multiple small orders. Market participants can instantly see the five best prices and total size for each price on each side of the book and the individual order sizes for the best bid and ask. There is no hidden quantity at the various levels of the book. Cantor G3 also shows the recent trend for the 10 most recent trades. For the period studied, BrokerTec has hidden and displayed order volume at each of the limit-order prices. The choice of what amount to display is not mandated. When a transaction exceeds the limit-order quantity there is a chance that hidden quantity will be available to fill the order at the same price.
[Insert Figure 1 here] Thus, while the two platforms are broadly similar they differ in terms of hidden orders, how widely the orderbook is viewed and the ease with which the order-book information can be understood at a glance. Both platforms allow for the possibility of 'work-ups'. In terms of clientele it is widely known in the industry that eSpeed has more of the share of the dealers who represent buy-side participants from the life assurance and pensions industry. This has led to a slight dominance by eSpeed in the trading of treasuries at the longer maturity. BrokerTec has a larger share of activity in all other maturity categories and this has been growing slightly over time, see EST. We examine the 2, 5, 10 and 30 year "on-the-run" Treasuries. Each record includes best ask and best bid prices at event frequency and we also have the orderbook quantities which allows us to ascertain the relative liquidity of the two platforms over time and by maturity. Our empirical analysis concentrates on the price data. We match records at all events with the prevailing prices from the two platforms at the following frequencies (5, 10, 15 and 30 second intervals). Tables 1 show that the average depth on BrokerTec is nearly twice that on eSpeed at the shorter maturities. BrokerTec also provides the narrower bid-ask spreads in short and medium term maturities (2-, 5-, 10-Year) while eSpeed provides tighter bid-ask spreads on average at the very long-term maturity (30-year). Note the use of A, B and a, b to denote the best ask and best bid price of BrokerTec and eSpeed respectively. Similarly, S and s denotes the bid-ask spread of BrokerTec and eSpeed. We adopt this notation for the remainder of the paper.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Methodology
To investigate the mechanics of price discovery, we use Gonzalo-Granger's (1995) permanent-transitory decomposition approach. The Gonzalo-Granger approach focuses on the components of the common factor and the error correction process; it measures each market's contribution to the common factor, where the contribution is defined to be a function of the markets' error correction coefficients. The Gonzalo-Granger model starts from the estimation of vector error correction model which in this case will be: 
where At, Bt are the ask and bid prices of BrokerTec, and where at, bt are the ask and bid prices of eSpeed and we write and  is a 4 1  vector (with elements adding up to one) that measures the contribution of market i to price discovery (see also Booth, So and Tse, 1999, and Harris et al., 2002) .
We note that if all elements in ( , , , It is worth noting that in ',    the parameters α and β are not uniquely identified. The cointegrating vectors in β have to be normalized in some way to obtain unique cointegrating relationships. One interesting case is when the rank of  is three. This leads intuitively to a set of restriction implying that each price changes is affected by its own lagged spread and the price gap between the two platforms. The restrictions required to achieve this are as follows:
We test that the rank of  is three and then test the above set of restrictions. We examine the size and significance of the adjustment parameters under this set of restrictions and this reveals the response by each price attributable to cross-platform disequilibrium and to own-platform bid-ask spread disequilibrium. We also note that if '  is specified as (2), we have ,     a 4 1  vector of ones and this simplifies the calculation of the price discovery parameter  .
Results
In this section, we first implement some exploratory testing regarding the long-run equilibrium between the two trading platforms. For instance, we investigate the long-run relationships between bid or ask prices on the two platforms separately. We then analyze the bid and ask prices on both platforms jointly using the Johansen procedure and we then examine where price discovery takes place. We get very different estimated magnitudes of adjustment to cross-platform disequilibrium when we apply the more general approach and this highlights a large source of error when the bid-ask spread disequilibria are dropped from the analysis. Nevertheless, we still find substantial support for the main hypothesis that eSpeed is the market that adjusts to true valuation errors and this implies that BrokerTec is where price discovery mainly occurs.
Exploratory Tests

14
We first show the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of whether the bid and ask price levels and their first differences on each platform are stationary. The results for the bid price (and the first difference of bid price) from the BrokerTec platform is shown in Table 2 Panel A (and Panel B for 1 st difference series). The stationarity and cointegration testing gives the expected results. It is clear that non-stationarity of the bid price level cannot be rejected.
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We can also reject non-stationarity for the case of the first difference of the bid price series. The results for the other 3 series are not shown but give similar conclusions.
Also, we find that the bid and ask prices on each platform are cointegrated with each other which implies that the bid-ask spread itself is stationary in each platform.
[Insert Table 2 
The ECM representation allows for testing of weak exogeneity and causality. This allows us to test whether disequilibrium between the two prices explains future movements in prices to restore equilibrium. If the burden of adjustment is unevenly shared we obtain insights about which platform is a better representation of underlying value at any instant and which platform produces prices that are, most likely, still responding to recent information shocks. To examine whether there is evidence of cointegration between the bid price on BrokerTec and the bid price on eSpeed, we The conclusion also remains the same if we test for evidence of cointegration between the ask prices on the two platforms.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Price Discovery
So far, we have examined the long-run equilibrium and adjustment to disequilibrium for the bid or ask prices on the two platforms separately. The main weakness associated with this analysis is the fact that price adjustments could be reflecting temporary bid-ask spread movements rather than market (mid-price) or true value movements. To control for these different sources of price adjustment we need to conduct the analysis jointly.
Thus, to test whether the equilibrating behavior within each platform is about "price discovery" rather than just bid-ask spread adjustments we must analyze the internal cointegrating relationships simultaneously. To achieve this we now turn to the maximum likelihood methods proposed by Johansen (1988) (one that allows the response to bid-ask disequilibrium to be accounted for as part of general price adjustment). We show that this gives much more plausible differences in the speed of adjustment on the two platforms found using the simpler analysis.
We already tested for non-stationarity of the various price levels and for stationarity of their first differences so we proceed to application of the Johansen cointegration analysis directly. We use the maximum orders of lags from these test regressions in our application of the multivariate Johansen procedure. We implement the rank test described in Section 5 and after testing for the restriction of three cointegrating vectors (which is accepted) we test for the normalizations on the cointegrating vectors in β that give rise to the within-platform adjustment and cross-platform adjustment as described earlier (these restrictions are also accepted).
We take the 5-year/5-second intervals in April 2005 for example. The maximum number of lags used in the Johansen representation of the four equation system of equations is picked as 5 (see table 5 ).
[Insert Table 5 here]
The rank test result is reported in table 6. This reveals that the rank of  is three.
17
[Insert Table 6 here]
That is, there are three cointegration relationships. Recall that we need to normalize the cointegrating vectors in β to obtain unique cointegrating relationships. As described earlier, the restriction is specified in Eq. (2). The test of this set of restrictions is accepted.
This has a Chi-square statistic of 7.285 with a p-value 0.063. The estimated equation
(excluding details of the short-run parameter estimates) is reproduced below as follows:
(3.119) 
This reveals that bid and ask price changes on BrokerTec are mainly affected by the lagged BrokerTec spread disequilibria and the lagged disequilibrium between the two platforms but there is also a significant small effect emanating from the lagged spread in the other platform. Likewise, the bid and ask price changes on eSpeed are affected by the lagged eSpeed spread and the lagged price gap between the two platforms. There is only a small effect running from the lagged spread of the other platform. Overall it is interesting to see that more of the price adjustment is related to bid-ask spread disequilibrium than to cross-platform disequilibrium and this highlight the need to control for such effects.
We can conclude from the differences in the magnitude of the response to cross-platform disequilibrium that more price discovery takes place on the BrokerTec platform. This confirms the findings using transaction data but now we find that the difference between the two platforms is not as stark as before. Both BrokerTec and eSpeed share the long-run driving dynamics. The signs of the adjustment coefficients are as expected, with prices on the BrokerTec platform tending to decrease in response to cross-platform disequilibrium and price on the eSpeed platform tending to increase in response to disequilibrium. The magnitude of the eSpeed adjustment to cross-platform disequilibrium is roughly one-third greater than that on BrokerTec. The calculated parameter of price discovery is ' (0.3117, 0.2969, 0.1733, 0.2181) ',   and the share for BrokerTec is 60.9% 18 while the share for eSpeed is 39.1%. So we can conclude with more confidence than before that eSpeed does more of the price adjustment to bring about long-run equilibrium.
But the difference in the magnitude of the adjustment coefficients is not as stark as before.
The 2-, 5-and 10-year Treasury instruments have similar results to those above (available from the authors on request). However, the 30-year Treasury provides a different story.
We analyze the 30-year bond data at 30-second intervals in August 2005. Tables 7 and 8 report the Ljung-Box statistics and rank tests results respectively, the maximum order of lags is 5 and the rank is 3.
[Insert Table 7 and 8 here]
The result is reproduced here for convenience. 
The result gives us an opposite story to that at the other maturities. Thus, in the case of the 30-year maturity, more price discovery takes place on the eSpeed platform. As before, both the BrokerTec and eSpeed platforms share the long-run driving dynamics. As expected, price on BrokerTec tends to decrease in response to disequilibrium and the price of eSpeed tends to increase in response to the disequilibrium. The speed of the adjustment on BrokerTec is almost twice the magnitude of that on eSpeed. This implies that price discovery for the long maturity Treasuries resides in the eSpeed platform and that adjustment to price changes occurs in the BrokerTec platform. This is further confirmed by the calculated parameter of price discovery ' (0.2352, 0.1458, 0.2387, 0.3803 ) ',   and the share for BrokerTec is 38.1% and the share for eSpeed is 61.9%. eSpeed is more attractive for the 30-year maturity in terms of transaction cost because it provides tighter bid-ask spreads on average (See Table 1 ). This implies a transaction cost effect on price discovery rather than a transparency effect.
Conclusion
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This paper focuses on the effect of differential trading activities and pre-trade transparency of competing inter-dealer electronic platforms in the US Treasury Market.
The analysis of simultaneously observed high-frequency data from these two very similar markets provides a unique opportunity to examine where price discovery is most concentrated under only mild differences in conditions. The two similarly transparent trading platforms differ mainly in terms of hidden limit orders and their shares of trading activity.
The findings only become reliable when bid and ask prices from both platforms are The fact that the more active and less transparent market seems to be winning more market share over time is partly consistent with the propositions of Bloomfield and O'Hara (2000) which asks whether more transparent markets can survive in such a context. However, the two platforms have continued to co-exist despite the differences in transparency. This probably reflects the sheer depth of this particular market and the legacy of their respective histories (particularly the fixed costs that have been incurred by some smaller participants who are only active on one or other of the two platforms and not both and for whom a change would be expensive and the benefits only marginal).
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Despite the movements in market shares it seems that the two platforms will continue to co-exist into the foreseeable future. Some of the largest participants seem to be willing to stay engaged in both markets for reasons that go beyond the small cost advantages they could generated by concentrating their activities on just one. The advantages for these large players seem to be enough to warrant continuation of the current equilibrium in market structure. The most likely benefit is the insurance that all participants obtain from having a back-up venue to facilitate execution of transactions if there is a market 'outage' in one platform (such as during the 9/11 atrocity). This benefit might be part of the explanation as to why the severe outcome forwarded by Bloomfield and O'Hara has not materialized.
Clearly, it is interesting that neither platform has chosen to differentiate itself in a major way in term of transparency which suggests that they are aware of the damage that such a unilateral change can bring to their market share. This also serves as a reminder for market regulators that dual platforms are likely to remain opposed to transparency changes unless all platforms are forced to move by a similar amount in this direction simultaneously. is not equal to zero is provided in footnote 6. For the case of an extremely large sample, these are -2.567, -2.862 and -3.4336 at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively. It is therefore not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the bid price of BrokerTec has a unit root while we can easily reject the presence of a unit root in the case of the first difference of the bid price. The Ljung-Box Q-statistic does not reveal any significant autocorrelations among the residuals. 
